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Abstract
This paper explores a much-neglected aspect of cultural policies: the role of the institutions in 
charge and the way they use the instruments at their disposal. It focuses on the film industry 
which offers the remarkable contrast on how the Korean film industry has outperformed the 
French one in less than twenty years. This paper provides three conclusions. First, it presents 
an economic analysis of the French and Korean institutions which shows that building a rich 
organization with a large degree of freedom for action and granting extensive subsidies is not 
a sure recipe for the success of the country’s film industry. Second, it explains this paradox 
by the types of subsidies used by the institutions—whether these subsidies target narrowly 
defined goals (on a film-per-film basis), or have objectives broad enough to benefit potentially 
all participants in the film industry, such as improving the infrastructure needed for producing 
films (studios, schools for actors). Last but not least, this paradox is also due to the abundance of 
subsidies and measures of all types at the disposal of rich institutions, which can easily become 
a source of costly inconsistencies. This paper provides two illustrations of these conflicts among 
the instruments provided. 
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It is often believed that the government should play a key role in developing its 
nation’s film industry. The state is expected to provide the necessary public support 
that the domestic film industry needs in order to cope with competition from the 
big-budget blockbusters out of Hollywood. Furthermore, it is also widely accepted 
that such public support cannot fail: if enough subsidies are granted, national 
film producers will prosper and achieve success. Nonetheless, there have always 
been some doubts on these views (as early as, for instance, Kornai), but they have 
not been backed up by robust information until recently. In his study, Parc has 
provided solid empirical evidence justifying these doubts. His analysis of the 
Korean film industry over the very long period of the past few decades shows that 
the government has had little, if any, role in the industry’s success. Rather, this 
achievement was primarily due to the involvement of business. 
Another crucial reason highlighted by Parc to explain Korea’s success is that the 
limited subsidy policy pursued by the government has been based on “indirect” 
rather than “direct” subsidies. Direct subsidies are those that have a precise target—
supporting the production of a specific film, specific company (TV channels, 
distributors, or movie theaters), or a specific factor of production (actors speaking 
a local language or non-permanent crew). In contrast, indirect subsidies—for 
instance, those granted to develop the infrastructure for the entire film industry, 
such as studios, cinema schools, or festivals promoting national production—can 
be beneficial to all participants. Parc’s observation has a key consequence: it shifts 
the focus away from the overall size of subsidies—which has largely dominated 
the debate on the film subsidies over the last few decades—to the question that 
is at least as (if not more) crucial from an economic point of view: the nature and 
structure of the various subsidies granted by a country. 
This paper explores further this question by examining an aspect that is 
often neglected though essential: the “agent” operating the subsidy policy. This 
approach avoids the frequent misleading assumption that film policies are decided 
in detail by governments and implemented by them without the intervention of 
any specialized institutions. This is particularly problematic in the film industry, 
which is regulated in many countries by institutions specifically designed for (and 
sometimes by) the industry. For simplicity’s sake, they will be referred to as the 
“institutions” throughout the paper. By the same token, the approach adopted in 
this paper facilitates a more detailed and pragmatic comparison of the existing 
practices of these institutions; hence, it provides a better view of the “best” practices.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section explains the reason for 
comparing France and Korea. In a nutshell, these countries have followed the same 
broad film policies, but they have witnessed developments of their film industries 
so different that it raises the question on the true effectiveness of these institutions 
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on this evolution. The second section presents the French Centre National du 
Cinéma et de l’Image Animée (CNC) and the Korean Film Council (KOFIC) and 
raises the following question: To what extent do these institutions differ in terms 
of freedom of action, and has this difference had a strong influence on the film 
policies they have enforced? 
The third section shifts the focus from the institutions to the instruments—that 
is, the subsidies per se. It investigates the economic differences among the wide 
array of subsidies used by these two institutions. Empirical evidence is provided 
on the different proportions of direct and indirect subsidies in Korea and France. 
It also stresses the many problems faced by the rich institutions—such as CNC—
using intensively direct subsidies and how KOFIC’s smaller overall subsidy program 
and stronger focus on indirect subsidies has made it largely immune to these 
problems.
The last section focuses on an inescapable dilemma: beyond its immediate goal, 
any film subsidy is doomed to have positive and negative effects on the different 
segments of the film industry. As a result, the “art” of a good subsidy policy is 
to balance these costs and benefits by using the most comprehensive analytical 
framework possible. This key issue is illustrated by analyzing two key instruments: 
the tax on the seat price which was the cornerstone of both CNC’s and KOFIC’s 
subsidy policies, and the tax relief schemes available to foreign filmmakers, which 
is one of the most recent instruments adopted by many countries.
1. WHY FOCUS ON INSTITUTIONS AND WHY COMPARE FRANCE AND KOREA?
One of the main reasons suggested by economic analysis on the need to carefully 
assess the full impact of institutions is the existence of the “principal-agent 
dilemma.” This concept examines the issue of an “agent” as the obedient servant of 
its “principal” (Shapiro; Stiglitz). In this paper, the principal is the government and 
the agent is the subsidizing institution. This dilemma occurs when the compatibility 
between the motivations of the agent and those of the principal is not always 
guaranteed. The film policy is a good candidate for which to analyze this situation. 
On one hand, it is not a policy of prime importance for a government which has 
low incentives to closely monitor its agent operating in this sector. On the other 
hand, for reasons shown below, institutions in charge of the film subsidy policy can 
have strong connections with the private vested interests of the film industry (film 
companies, producers, actors, or movie theaters) that exert hard pressure on their 
loyalty to the principal.
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This loyalty is under even greater stress when, as will be illustrated in the 
next section, the decisions about the types of subsidies to grant, the timing of 
their introduction, and even their magnitude have been largely devolved to the 
institutions, granting them a substantial degree of freedom of action. It goes beyond 
this paper to analyze the reasons that have induced governments to grant such a 
degree of freedom. It could be the noble desire to create some healthy distance 
between politics and culture. Or it could be the fear of political power that those 
with key vested interests in the film industry hold; for example, famous directors or 
actors who through their media connections can influence the career/reputation 
of policy-makers.
There are thus good theoretical and empirical reasons to examine the institutions 
that operate film subsidy policies. However, until recently, scant attention has been 
devoted to them. The handful of existing studies are limited to a description of the 
number and features of the different instruments at the disposal of the institutions 
(Rouet; Lange and Westcott; Newman-Baudais; Milla, Fontaine, and Kanzler). 
Furthermore, they have not sought to connect them to the success of the film 
industries at stake through the use of rigorous economic analysis. It is fair to say 
that the reason for these limitations may be that these studies cover only European 
countries (with the exception of Québec for Rouet)—that is, a range of cases that 
are so similar in many respects that it is hard to draw any noteworthy lessons when 
comparing them. 
In sharp contrast, the development of the Korean and French film industries 
offers a greater contrast that helps to draw meaningful lessons (Parc; Messerlin 
and Parc). In the mid-1990s, Korea was lagging far behind France in each of the 
four main criteria of comparison: the size of the film market (the Korean film 
market was one-third of the French market in terms of admissions and box-office 
revenues), the annual number of admissions per inhabitant (1.1 in Korea and 2.5 in 
France), the share of the movie-goers watching domestic movies (20-25 percent in 
Korea and 35-37 percent in France), and the number of films produced (65 in Korea 
and 140 in France). Yet only twenty years later in 2016, the situation has completely 
reversed: a slightly larger film market in Korea than in France (admissions and 
box office), 4.2 admissions per inhabitant in Korea compared to 3.2 for France, 54 
percent of movie-goers watching domestic films in Korea compared to 37 percent 
in France, and substantially more films produced in Korea than in France.2 Last 
but not least, this remarkable change has occurred with far smaller subsidies 
distributed in Korea than in France. In their peak year, 2014, the Korean subsidies 
amounted to barely one fourth of the French subsidies, whereas the revenues of 
Korean films at the domestic box office were 1.5 larger than the revenues of French 
films in their market (Parc and Messerlin).3
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2. THE FRENCH AND KOREAN INSTITUTIONS: VAST DIFFERENCES
Table 1 provides the most important information on CNC and KOFIC (it does not, 
however, cover French and Korean regional institutions because they are small 
in both countries). CNC is clearly the dominant institution in France—a recent 
report from the French Senate does not hesitate to use the term “omnipotence” 
(Laborde). Subsidies from the French Ministry of Culture itself are small, and their 
use is usually handled by CNC in any case. In contrast, the Korean Ministry of 
Culture is more directly involved, with its own subsidy budget for the film industry 
amounting to US$ 22 million in 2016. 
Table 1. The institutions: budget, funding sources, coverage, 2016
   CNC KOFIC
Date of establishment (1936) 1946 1999 (2007) [a]
General mandate
Prepare domestic regulations Yes Some influence
Implement domestic regulations Yes Yes
Improve industry structure Yes No
International relations Yes (since 1991) No
Funding sources [b]
Tax on seat in movie-theaters 1948 / 10,72% / 168 2007 / 3% / 45
Tax on TV services 1986 / 5.5% / 564 No
Tax on videos & VoD [c] 1993 etc. / many / 20 No
State budget [d] Small Small
Sectors covered Film, TV, video, games Film, video
Resources: Budget and staff
Annual budget for all sectors 868 62
Annual budget for film only [e] 495 62
Operating budget 41 9
Number of staff 471 130
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Number of films supported
Integrally domestic 209 [f]
Majority domestic 81 [g]
 Minority domestic 74 [g]
Notes: [a]: 2007 is the year of the establishment of the Film Development Fund, KOFIC’s financial 
arm. [b] respectively: year of introduction, current tax rate in %, amount of current revenues in 2016 
(in US$ million). [c] this tax has been extended over the years to similar services, including most 
recently to internet operators. [d] does not take into account losses of tax revenues due to tax relief 
schemes. [e]: for France, includes support to horizontal actions (dispostifs transversaux) of interest 
for the film sector. [f]: KOFIC supports only independent films with a budget lower than US$ 900,000. 
[g]: irrelevant.
Sources: France: CNC (“Bilan annuel” 251). Korea: Ministry of Culture, 
Sport and Tourism, Annual Budget Expenditure Planning (2016).
2.1. Differences in existence, mandate, and supervision
The first difference is the huge gap in terms of the length of their existence: more 
than seven decades for CNC compared to just two decades for KOFIC.4 This aspect 
may seem anecdotal at first, but in the context of the principal-agent dilemma, it 
is key for public institutions with some degree of freedom to act on their own. 
On the one hand, a long duration in existence could be seen as a positive source 
of knowledge and experience if information is shared among participants—that 
is, if there is no risk of the principal-agent dilemma. For example, CNC produces 
a remarkable set of data on the French film industry, with consistent time-series 
dating back from the 1970s that are very useful for independent research. KOFIC, 
meanwhile, produces a similar set of data, the only limit being that some data from 
before 2004-2008 are less detailed (for instance, the various origins of foreign films 
released in Korea).
On the other hand, time has a negative impact if the information is asymmetrical 
(not the same for the principal and the agent). It then allows a long-lasting 
institution to reinforce its power vis-à-vis short-term political decision-makers 
who are largely unaware of the intricacies of film policies and increasingly complex 
subsidy schemes. In this case, time amplifies the principal-agent dilemma. This 
aspect has been magnified by the conditions that have existed in the creation of the 
institutions. KOFIC was reorganized at a time (1999-2007) when the general belief 
in the positive role of competition was strong in Korea. It was thus conceived as a 
positive way to embrace markets in an increasingly globalized world. In contrast, 
CNC is the heir of a private body (Confédération Générale du Cinéma) that was 
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founded by private-vested interests within the film industry during the mid-
1930s. The dominant idea at this time was the notion of “organizing” markets by 
facilitating collusion among market participants with no international perspective. 
This “corporatist” view was endorsed by the Vichy government during the Second 
World War and was also confirmed by the French government in 1946 when CNC 
was created (Farchy; Hayward; CNC, “60 ans du CNC”).
A second difference concerns the mandate of these institutions and their 
supervision. The CNC mandate includes the very important tasks to prepare and 
implement the regulatory framework as well as to advise on international issues, 
in particular on negotiations of trade agreements. The supervision of CNC by the 
French Ministry of Culture and by the French National Assembly or the Senate can 
be qualified at best as “notional.” The result is that there are not many French public 
institutions who can make an independent review of CNC’s policies. One of the few 
is the French Auditing Court (Cour des Comptes) which indeed has recently devoted 
a fair amount of attention, such as criticizing CNC for “unorthodox” financial 
procedures (Cour des Comptes, “La gestion”, “Les soutiens”). However, the Court 
does not conduct such a process on an annual basis, and its recommendations do 
not lead automatically to any actual reform of the institution. For that to happen, 
they would need to be translated into political measures and enforced by legal 
means that require decisions from the government and/or the National Assembly. 
As yet, very few members of these institutions are ready to fight the powerful 
French film lobby. In contrast, the Korean Ministry of Culture keeps a tight grip on 
the Korean regulatory framework, and its relationship with KOFIC is supervised 
by the government. Within this framework, KOFIC has achieved some influence 
in terms of policy-making and implementation, but tensions between the Ministry 
and KOFIC can emerge on overlapping issues, which raises efficiency problems.
2.2. Differences in funding sources and coverage
Another important difference between CNC and KOFIC is the source of their 
funds, and their evolution over time. CNC funds have been based on an ever-
expanding array of sources: special taxes on theater seats (1948), TV operators 
(1986), videos and Video on Demand (1993, 2003, extended to all internet operators 
in 2007 and 2017). In contrast, KOFIC’s Film Development Fund has been funded 
mostly by the seat tax since 2007. It is no surprise then, that CNC is the richer 
organization. Table 1 shows that the overall budget for CNC is fourteen times larger 
than KOFIC—largely because of the taxes imposed on TV operators which provides 
65 percent of its total budget (“Les soutiens” ). This setup has also allowed CNC to 
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recruit and employ a large and stable staff—three times larger than KOFIC—which 
has been a key source for its influence in political circles and public opinion at large.
This wider base of resources has made it possible for CNC to follow a true 
“industrial policy” in the film industry. Table 1 shows that CNC is involved in almost 
every French film—“integrally French” (private funds are entirely French) or co-
produced “majority French” (French private funds represent more than 50 percent 
of the private funds), or “minority French” (French private funds represent less 
than 50 percent of private funds). Indeed, until recently, French nationality was 
linked to being financed by CNC to the extent that a film was only considered 
a French production if it was subsidized by CNC.5 In sharp contrast, the more 
limited resources of KOFIC have prevented it from micromanaging the Korean film 
industry, inducing KOFIC to focus on independent art films with a small budget 
(less than US$ 900,000 before marketing costs).
This larger base of resources has granted CNC a much wider mandate than 
KOFIC in terms of sectors covered. Not only is it in charge of the film industry, 
but it is also deeply involved in the production of films by the TV operators and of 
their screening by TV channels (though it shares this role with Conseil Supérieur 
de l’Audiovisuel). In contrast, KOFIC has no mandate in the TV sector. As a result, 
the economic fate of the French film and TV sectors has been linked by regulatory 
factors—a burden for both in the long run. In contrast, in Korea the film industry 
produces films and the TV sector produces TV dramas. If these two sectors have 
increasing relations, it is under the competitive pressures of digitization.
2.3. “Fiscal autonomy”: a blessing or a curse? 
The most important consequence of the seat tax (and of the other taxes listed in 
Table 1 in the CNC case) is that it has granted CNC and KOFIC “fiscal autonomy.” 
In other words, these funds are not subjected to the basic principle of a public 
budget whereby a tax should not be raised in order to be allocated to a specific 
goal. Fiscal autonomy has been granted to CNC since its creation (simultaneously 
with the introduction of the seat tax) and it is very large since there are few funds 
transferred from the Ministry to CNC. In contrast, as mentioned above, KOFIC 
was only granted fiscal autonomy in 2007, with the funds provided by the Ministry 
to KOFIC decreasing in turn. This change was presented as compensation for the 
cut in the Korean screen quota in 2006 (Parc). What follows explores the most 
remarkable features of the seat tax in order to assess its impact better. 
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From a legal point of view, the seat tax is specific to the film industry: as stressed 
above, it is raised via the movie theaters, and its amount is exclusively allocated to 
the film industry. Hence, its revenues do not run the risk of being diverted to other 
sectors of the domestic economy (were the National Assembly to do so). This legal 
feature has enabled the vested interests in the film industry to tighten their grip 
on this instrument—firstly by making it permanent. The French seat tax created 
in 1948 was initially supposed to last only three years. Afterwards, this deadline 
was extended to five years, and later the seat tax was renewed in 1953 for four 
years before being definitively entrenched in the French legal system in 1959 (CNC, 
“60 ans du CNC”; Vezyrouglou and Péton). One further crucial step toward fiscal 
autonomy was achieved in 2007 when the movie theater operators were allowed 
to collect the seat tax rather than the French fiscal authorities (Cour des Comptes, 
“Les soutiens” 26). A similar evolution, though more limited, was observed in Korea, 
with the seat tax imposed in 2007 for five years, and then extended in December 
2014 until December 2021.
From a political and economic point of view, the most remarkable feature of 
the seat tax is its capacity to coalesce the different vested interests of the film 
industry. This feature is crucial because these interests are antagonistic by nature. 
For instance, protecting a film industry by an import or a screen quota—the 
protectionist barriers used before subsidies—has the notable drawback that only 
one segment of the “chain of production” in the film industry is protected to the 
detriment of the others: import quotas benefit domestic importers, while screen 
quotas help domestic distributors. Ironically, none of these quotas benefit domestic 
filmmakers (Parc). In contrast, subsidies are able to smooth over conflicts among 
the various interests (segments) of the industry through a two-step process: first, 
all the vested interests unite in order to receive collectively the largest funds or 
support possible from the state; next, they negotiate among themselves on how to 
share these subsidies, often with the go-between help of the domestic subsidizing 
institution. 
However, if these legal and political features of the seat tax (and of the other 
funds raised by the institutions) have made life easier for the vested interests of the 
film industry, the end result can be negative for the film industry as a whole in the 
long run. As stressed in the first section, although the French film industry is more 
subsidized than its Korean equivalent, this has not prevented it from suffering more 
in terms of audience size, market share, and annual number of movies produced. 
This shows that at some point, fiscal autonomy generates higher costs than benefits. 
In other words, not only did the lower rate of the Korean seat tax deter KOFIC 
from following the same industrial policy as CNC, but it has also forced it to look 
for a better policy, rather than relying upon ever increasing subsidies. This point is 
revisited in the following sections.
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3. COMPARING THE TYPES OF SUBSIDIES
The debate on film subsidies has rarely be accompanied by a thorough discussion 
of the different types utilized and the respective pros and cons of their application. 
When facing a request from a vested interest, the institutions have generally 
reacted by designing a new ad hoc subsidy without examining its consequences 
on the other subsidies, nor on the film industry in the long run. This impulsive 
behavior has created an inflation of different types of subsidies. In 2011, there were 
no less than sixty types of French selective subsidies accounting for roughly US$ 
250 million (Cour des Comptes, “La gestion” 46). Over the last decade, KOFIC’s 
budget has no less than one hundred different budgetary lines, most of them 
having small or intermittent amounts. This context makes for an interesting case 
to explore whether the abovementioned differences between France and Korea 
have ended up with alternative structures for their subsidy schemes, and if so, the 
consequences on the success of their policies. 
3.1. A broad typology of film subsidies
As mentioned in the introduction, Parc was one of the first scholars to take 
into account an essential structural aspect by stressing the key difference between 
“direct” and “indirect” subsidies in the film industry. This distinction is crucial 
for designing an economically sound instrument for the public support of films. 
Indirect subsidies are designed to meet the basic infrastructure demands of the 
whole film business of the country, which makes their potential benefits large and 
widespread. For instance, public support for building the appropriate range of 
studios or skills (human capital) provides good working conditions and a qualified 
workforce at an affordable price for all the domestic filmmakers. If the market for 
renting studios or hiring from the labor market is not distorted by uncompetitive 
practices, studio and labor services will be used by the filmmakers offering the 
highest expectations in terms of success—as far as it is possible to predict success 
in this business. 
One could argue that indirect public subsidies are not necessary, that private 
operators could invest in the film infrastructure. This has been the case with the 
famous Hollywood “bricks and mortar” studios in the 1920s to the 1950s (and 
to some extent in China today, with the caveat that Chinese investors are often 
state-owned companies). This has also been the case for schools, actors, or special 
effects technicians. However, private operators may not provide the infrastructure 
for the socially desirable amount. As a result, indirect public subsidies can still be 
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useful. They are somewhat akin to public investment in roads, railways, or internet 
infrastructure. 
That said, there is always the risk that indirect public subsidies may end up 
supporting infrastructure that is too large or inadequate. The latter is likely to 
always be wasteful, but an oversized infrastructure is a more manageable issue. 
Such a situation can happen because of a fall or a decline in the domestic film 
industry: in this respect, the solution is to hire out studios to foreign filmmakers. 
An oversized infrastructure can also happen because governments want to 
attract foreign filmmakers at any cost. The decision by many countries to invest 
in their film infrastructure at the same time could then lead to a global excess 
supply of studios. This may have been the case during the last decade, with many 
governments investing in new studios or refurbishing old ones in order to attract 
foreign filmmakers (as was the case in Central or Eastern Europe). However, these 
examples should not dampen the principle of indirect public subsidies; rather they 
simply stress the need to follow a wise policy in this case.
In sharp contrast, the fact that each direct subsidy supports the production of a 
specific movie makes it intrinsically very risky—with a non-negligible probability 
to have net costs. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, systematic evidence on these 
net costs is not available.6 Direct subsidies are similar to the industrial policy of 
“picking the winners,” with the subsidizing institution “betting” on the capacity of 
the filmmaker in question to produce a film profitable from a financial perspective 
or rewarding from a cultural point of view—depending on the criteria used by the 
institution. Advocates of direct subsidies argue that these schemes have at least 
the merit of generating a few successes. However, this argument does not take 
into account the opportunity costs when direct subsidies are granted. Since the 
total budget of the subsidizing institution is limited by the level of taxes raised—
even for a rich institution such as CNC. Granting a subsidy of US$ 1 million to 
filmmaker “A” implies that filmmaker “B” or “C” will not receive the same support, 
despite the fact that their movies could have been more profitable in financial 
terms or more rewarding in cultural terms. In other words, considering the high 
level of uncertainty in the film business, direct subsidies are doomed to have high 
opportunity costs—that is, to leave unfunded a significant number of film projects 
that could have potentially earned more financial revenue or generated more 
cultural value than the ones that were funded. 
Institutions are well aware of these risks. They tend to address them by 
having recourse to technical advice from a large number of “experts” organized 
in committees. For instance, in 2011, CNC had 46 committees made up of 656 
professional experts (Cour des Comptes, “La gestion” 50). The large number of 
committees does not eliminate (not even necessarily reduce) the intrinsic weakness 
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of such an approach. It favors massively the incumbents in the long run—leading 
to a fall in cultural creativity and diversity. The vast majority of the “professional 
experts” is by definition working in the film industry—hence, it is composed of 
friends and/or competitors of the film producers who are supposed to assess the 
projects. This is all the more the case when the committee approach has lasted for 
decades. As a result, this approach in the long run generates an environment that is 
increasingly isolated from the demands of the movie-goers. Indeed, these flaws are 
serious enough to have been underlined by an official report which recommended 
the need for profound reform (Cour des Comptes, “La gestion” 50).
3.2. Striking differences between France and Korea
Keeping in mind this broad picture, it is now possible to make useful observations 
on the French and Korean subsidy schemes. Table 2 presents the subsidies granted 
in 2016 by CNC and KOFIC (leaving aside those distributed by the Korean Ministry 
of Culture in the context of its General and Special Accounts). Table 2 relies on 
the proposition that subsidies granted to the production, distribution, and movie 
theater segments are mostly “direct.” This is because most of the subsidies in the 
production segment are granted to individual film projects, while most of the 
subsidies related to distribution are provided to specific large firms (Lalevé and 
Levy-Hartman), and most of the subsidies in the movie-theater segment are for 
large groups or individual movie theaters. In contrast, most of the subsidies granted 
for the promotion of the national film industry or for building physical and human 
capital can be classified as “indirect” subsidies since they do not target individual 
projects. 
Table 2. The different types of subsidies, 2016
 Segments CNC  KOFIC
of the All subsidies Automatic All subsidies
 film industry Mio $ % subsid. [a]  Mio $ %
Direct subsidies
Production 139.2 28.1 64.1 10.2 16.4
Distribution 54.8 11.1 78.4 0.4 0.7
Movie theaters 167.5 33.8 49.3  2.9 4.6
 Total 361.4 73.0 59.4  13.5 21.7
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Indirect subsidies
Infrastructure [b] 69.2 14.0 NA 40.2 64.5
Promotion 64.2 13.0 NA  8.7 13.8
 Total 133.4 27.0 NA  48.9 78.3
Total 494.8 100.0 43.4  62.4 100.0
Note: Table 2 does not take into account public expenses generated by tax relief schemes. [a] Share 
of the automatic subsidies in all subsidies. [b] French indirect subsidies in infrastructure include 
support to horizontal actions (“dispostifs transversaux”) important for the film industry. Korean 
support includes investment funds granted to various organizations (such as the Fund of the Funds).
Sources: France: CNC (“Bilan annuel” 251). Korea: Ministry of Culture, 
Sport and Tourism, Annual Budget Expenditure Planning.
Table 2 introduces an additional key distinction within the domain of direct 
subsidies by breaking them down into “automatic” and “selective” subsidies (these 
are terms used by CNC). Automatic subsidies consisting of “drawing rights” are 
those made available to film producers according to the success of their previous 
movies at the box-office. Such subsidies can be particularly harmful from an 
economic perspective—and even more from a cultural point of view—to the extent 
that they reflect past production. Thus, they risk fossilizing film production, both 
in terms of companies and ideas. In contrast, selective subsidies seek to recognize 
promising film projects on the basis of a predefined set of criteria (renewal of 
talents, original scripts, etc.) to be used by the professional experts when making 
their judgment on the projects. To this extent, they are less harmful than automatic 
subsidies. Although, as mentioned above, they have a very high risk of having to 
pick winners in an unpredictable industry.
That said, Table 2 shows a striking contrast between CNC and KOFIC, going 
well beyond the differences shown in Table 1. The first main result from Table 2 is 
that it provides robust evidence supporting Parc’s statement on direct vs. indirect 
subsidies. Korean support consists largely of indirect subsidies: 78.3 percent in the 
case of KOFIC, compared to a paltry 27 percent for CNC. Subsidies for infrastructure 
represent 64.5 percent in the case of KOFIC, compared to only 14 percent for CNC.7 
It is also noteworthy that the largest share of the French film subsidies in 2016 was 
granted to the movie theater segment which absorbed almost 34 percent of the 
total amount of subsidies granted to the film industry—an awkward feature of the 
French subsidy policy which will be examined in more detail in section 4.
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The second main result of Table 2 is the importance of the automatic subsidies 
among France’s direct subsidies. In 2016, they represented 59.4 percent of the total 
public support to the production, distribution, and movie theater segments and 
43.4 percent of the total amount of public support to the film industry.
All these results suggest that, even if it wanted to, KOFIC is less equipped than 
CNC to follow a micromanaged industrial policy: in particular, its limited funds 
constitute a strong obstacle to such an approach. This is all the more the case 
because automatic direct subsidies are a politically sustainable policy only if the 
overall amount of subsidies is large enough to satisfy most of the vested interests in 
the various segments of the film industry.
4. CONSISTENCY OF THE SUBSIDY SCHEMES
Rich institutions with a considerable degree of freedom, large fiscal autonomy, and 
a corporatist heritage are prone to grant, without much restraint, direct subsidies 
requested by their members. These features are not conducive to an economically 
sound approach which recognizes that any subsidy can have unexpected and 
unintended negative effects besides its expected positive impact for its narrow 
goal. They induce these institutions to ignore that the cost-benefit “balance” of 
any subsidy critically matters from the point of view of economic profitability as 
well as for cultural creativity; to oppose these two perspectives would be a mistake 
as will be below. Assessing this balance should be the core task of the institutions. 
However, it is rarely done because if they do not accept all the requests, they will 
face the ire of the segment of the film industry requesting the subsidy, and possibly 
endanger the fragile coalition of the antagonistic private-vested interests on which 
these institutions are based. This section presents two cases illustrating the costs 
of the inconsistencies among existing subsidies—one subsidy eroding or distorting 
the impact of other measures with ultimately a negative effect on cultural creativity. 
4.1. Seat tax and subsidies to movie theaters
The first case examines the seat tax in conjunction with the subsidies granted to 
the movie theaters. Both Korea and France have adopted a seat tax, but there are 
two key differences. First, the Korean rate is much lower than the French rate—3 
percent compared to 10.72 percent. Second, Korean subsidies to movie-theaters 
are only granted to art houses: that is, those specialized in exhibiting “Art et essai” 
films. In contrast, French subsidies to the movie theaters are granted to all kinds of 
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theaters. Table 2 shows that they are massive: for example, they amounted to US$ 
167 million in 2016, one-third of all the subsidies to the film sector. Moreover, they 
are granted under both forms (automatic and selective).
Such a large amount of subsidies raises a fundamental question. To what extent 
is it justifiable? After all, the movie theater segment is a very concentrated sector, 
dominated by large private firms. In France, ten movie theater chains account for 
almost 59 percent of all the admissions in 2017. Such large private firms should be 
more than capable enough to generate funds for their business, particularly as they 
screen entertainment films (as opposed to “Art et essai” films). Clearly, subsidies to 
“Art et essai” movie theaters make economic and cultural sense to the extent that 
these films have a positive impact on cultural creativity and diversity. Indeed, such 
subsidies were introduced in France in 1979 and in Korea in 2002.
In contrast, the French combination of a high seat tax and massive subsidies to 
the movie theaters screening entertainment films needs to be carefully examined. 
Interestingly, the level of French subsidies granted to the movie theaters (Table 
2) matches almost perfectly the revenue of the seat tax (Table 1), a remarkable 
situation that has prevailed since 2011. In other words, the seat tax appears de facto 
as a revenue collected by the movie theaters to support them.
At first glance, such a tax-subsidy mix could be seen as a neutral operation. 
However, it creates many costs that need to be revealed. First, paradoxically it 
imposes costs on the movie theater sector itself in the form of lost audience. As the 
seat tax increases the ticket price paid by the movie-goers, it reduces the audience 
and revenues of the theaters compared to what the situation would have been in the 
absence of the seat tax (or in the case of a smaller tax). Interestingly, the number of 
movie-goers per inhabitant in France has grown by a meager 3 percent since 2000, 
despite the massive subsidies to movie theaters. And this number is lower than in 
Korea and the United States, two countries that have a flourishing film industry 
and do not subsidize their movie theaters.
Second, a smaller audience has two undesirable linked effects on French film 
production. First, it makes life particularly harder for French film producers: 
more expensive seats create a situation where movie-goers will have to limit their 
choices among the films regardless of their origin. Naturally, this creates fiercer 
competition among the films screened at movie theaters. Potential blockbusters or, 
more generally, films with a strong industrial support can cope with this increased 
competition. However, many French films are unlikely to meet these conditions, and 
hence are also unlikely to survive in this tougher environment, which demonstrates 
how the tax-subsidy mix discriminates against cultural diversity in the local film 
industry. This undesirable effect is amplified by a second one. Robust empirical 
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evidence shows that French subsidies to the movie theaters discriminates in favor 
of US films to the detriment of French films (Messerlin and Parc). The reason is 
simple: by boosting the technical upgrading of the theaters, subsidies favor the 
screening of US films which are, on average, more hi-tech intensive than French 
films.
Who, therefore, gains from the current tax-subsidy system? The first group 
consists of the firms who equip the French movie theaters and benefit from both 
positive volume and price effect. Increasing subsidies to the French theaters 
expands, partly artificially, the demand for equipment (volume effect), and 
they also inflate the costs of this equipment (price effect). A second category of 
beneficiaries pertains to the movie theater segment itself, since some are likely to 
be more effective in gaining subsidies than others. In other words, the current tax-
subsidy system favors some French theaters to the detriment of others on a basis 
that is not economically nor culturally sound. This risk is higher because half of 
the subsidies granted to the movie theaters are automatic which, as stressed in the 
previous section, favor incumbents.
Two options could be explored to improve the situation (both should be 
implemented progressively in order to allow for a smooth transition). First, the 
most drastic option would be to eliminate the seat tax and the subsidies to movie 
theaters altogether. Movie-goers will be better off: tickets will be less expensive, 
hence will generate larger crowds for watching films. Movie theaters as a whole 
will be better off due to a larger audience and also because they will adopt a more 
disciplined investment policy—the opposite effect of subsidies as a source of over-
spending. That said, it is likely that there will be winners and losers within the 
movie-theater segment. The rest of the French film industry—and particularly its 
film producers—will be in a healthier situation to the extent that there will be more 
potential movie-goers.
A “softer” option would be to eliminate only the automatic subsidies to the movie 
theaters (roughly US$ 83 million) on the basis that they reinforce the position of 
incumbents for no economically or culturally sound reason. The positive impact 
of the tax cut will not be as great as in the first option because it is smaller. That 
said, the reduced seat tax could be used to fund selective subsidies to these movie 
theaters that would deserve such a treatment (art houses). Interestingly, in this 
second option, the reduced French seat tax rate (roughly 5 percent) would be close 
to the Korean rate (3 percent). As shown in section 1, the success of the Korean film 
industry provides ample evidence that such an option is unlikely to endanger the 
growth of the domestic film industry. 
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4.2 Tax relief for foreign filmmakers: boosting domestic demand  
for more subsidies
The second illustration of potential reforms is related to the tax relief schemes 
that have become a key component among the film policies of major countries over 
the last decade (Parc and Messerlin). Tax relief is a complex instrument. They are de 
jure indirect subsidies to the extent that they are offered to all film producers under 
the same conditions and that they have a substantial infrastructure dimension. 
However, they are de facto direct subsidies because some filmmakers will be better at 
using them than others. The following part examines a recent change in the French 
subsidy policy, namely the adoption in 2014 of a new tax relief scheme targeting 
foreign filmmakers (the French acronym is “crédit d’impôt international.” hereafter 
C2I) in addition to tax relief which has been available to French filmmakers since 
2004 (the French acronym is “crédit d’impôt cinéma,” hereafter CIC). In contrast, in 
Korea, support for foreign filmmakers (for shooting or post-production in Korea) 
is limited, and it is not provided by KOFIC.
In a nutshell, C2I should reduce the benefits from the CIC subsidy scheme for 
French filmmakers, compared to the situation wherein C2I did not exist. Foreign 
film producers benefiting from C2I compete with French filmmakers to get access 
to these scarce resources in France, such as studios or attractive locations. These 
resources should then become more expansive for French filmmakers compared to 
how it was before the introduction of C2I. 
A more detailed analysis gives a sense of the main winners and losers. Introducing 
the C2I scheme generates foreign demand for French studios (assuming, for 
simplicity, that there was no foreign demand before) in addition to the French 
demand for studios. This higher overall demand increases the rental price of the 
French studios. French studios are thus winners, with a larger demand of their 
services and higher rental prices as well. Foreign filmmakers are also winners: the 
French C2I increases the world supply of studios they have access to. In contrast, 
the French filmmakers are losers: because of higher rental prices of the French 
studios, they have to reduce their demand for these studios or find affordable 
foreign studios (a search which is necessarily costly).
C2I can thus be analyzed as an implicit choice in terms of the industrial policy 
between two segments of the French film industry—French studios vs. French film 
producers. Ironically, the French film producers who are the closest competitors 
with the foreign filmmakers are likely to be the most hurt by C2I since they have a 
demand in terms of studios close to those of the foreign producers.
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The most frequent argument for justifying the introduction of C2I is the need 
to face competition by countries implementing massive tax relief schemes in favor 
of foreign film producers, such as the UK or Canada. This is not a very compelling 
argument. Why should CNC imitate the UK policy which has not solved the 
problems of the British independent film industry—and why should it not imitate 
the Korean policy which has contributed to enhance its domestic film industry?
CONCLUDING REMARKS: SUBSIDIES AND REGULATIONS
So far, the debate on film subsidies has mostly dealt with the overall amount 
provided. This paper shifts the focus to the “structure” of the subsidy schemes which 
depends on two essential factors: the institutions granting the subsidies and the 
detailed nature of these subsidies—whether they are direct or indirect, automatic 
or selective. Comparing the Korean and French institutions, this paper comes to 
the conclusion that a larger degree of freedom and fiscal autonomy combined 
with a larger budget has led to a less successful film policy. The most fundamental 
reason for this result is that rich institutions are prone to grant without a detailed 
assessment of the subsidies sought after by vested interests and that they tend to 
keep an economically unsound structure of subsidies (too high a proportion of 
direct automatic subsidies and too low a proportion of indirect subsidies). Lastly, 
this paper examines in depth two cases of subsidies that have been introduced 
without paying attention to the inconsistencies they create in the film industry. It 
suggests options for reforms which would make the French subsidy system closer 
to the Korean one which has accompanied the remarkable growth of the Korean 
film industry. More generally, this paper seeks to contribute to a pragmatic and 
substantive debate on how to support the film industry of a country in the most 
efficient way—again from an economic and cultural perspective.
This paper has focused on subsidies which are among the most important 
public policies in the film industry. However, other policies can interfere with the 
provision of subsidies. For instance, there are rigid legal obligations between the 
cinema and TV sectors in some countries. These obligations have often been the 
“price to pay” for receiving large subsidies. For instance, the mandatory funding of 
French films by TV channels has been “paid” by a rigid sequencing of the release of 
movies in theaters and TV channels (“chronology of the media”). Ultimately, these 
regulations have harmed the prosperity of both the film and broadcasting sectors. 
There is thus a need for more studies on the theme of “consistent policies” which 
would explore the interactions between subsidy policies and regulations imposed 
on the film industry or on its related sectors, such as broadcasting.
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Notes
1. I would like to thank the two referees for their very useful comments, Dong-
joon Doh (Film Policy Research Institute, KOFIC), Kyuchan Kim, Yeon Lee, and 
Jimmyn Parc for their invaluable help.
2. Excluding films under co-production since the Korean film industry rarely uses 
this format, reportedly 12 to 18 films per year in 2015-2016.
3. This paper concentrates on subsidies stricto sensu and excludes French and Korean 
tax relief schemes. For details, see Parc and Messerlin.
4. In fact, KOFIC was first established in April 1973. However, it underwent 
profound reform in 1999 (the year mentioned in Table 1). Its financial arm (the 
Film Development Fund) though was established only in 2007, following the 
introduction of the seat tax in 2006. As a result, for this paper that seeks to 
compare CNC and KOFIC, the most accurate birthdate for KOFIC seems to be 
2007.
5. The most ironic illustration of this link is The tree, the mayor and the mediatheque 
(“L’arbre, le maire et la médiathèque ou les sept hasards”), a film profoundly 
“French” in its inspiration and style which was produced in 1993 by the renowned 
French director Eric Rohmer with no CNC support.
6. A couple of indicators suggest that these net costs are large. In France, the 
percentage of financially profitable films is low (10 to 15 percent) even after 
treating direct subsidies as a contribution to the costs (CNC 2013; Legras). Only 
5 percent of direct subsidies (avances remboursables) granted as “advances” to be 
reimbursed when the films are released have been reimbursed during the period 
2001-2010 (Cour des Comptes, “Les soutiens”  37).
7. It is noteworthy that, since 2015, KOFIC direct subsidies to producers have 
increased, while indirect subsidies to infrastructure have decreased. However, 
this drift is still limited: in 2017, all the indirect subsidies amount to 72 percent 
of the total support. This evolution happens in the context of a decline of total 
KOFIC support which is in 2017, two-third of its amount in 2012 (the peak year).
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